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COVID-19 AND POPULISM: A SUI GENERIS CRISIS 
 
Abstract 
It is widely believed that populists benefit from crisis situations. This chapter discusses the literature 
on crises and populism from a theoretical perspective and provides a novel framework of analysis for 
addressing the study of the COVID-19 crisis in the light of its (de)politicization. This framework 
allows the study of the politicization of the COVID-19 issue by populists looking at the divide 
between the political and the non-political status of the issue, disputes about different stakes and their 
relative priority in managing the crisis, and issue-specific and policy-related contentions about 
COVID-19. The general research question is whether populists in Europe used the COVID-19 issue 
to gain centrality in the political field and/or to push forward new opposition lines. A further related 
question is to pinpoint whether populists reacted in a similar way across countries or whether they 
adapted their response according to their institutional role.  
 
GIULIANO BOBBA, University of Turin (giuliano.bobba@unito.it) 
NICOLAS HUBÉ, University of Lorraine 
 
Introduction  
Although the debate about the link between crises and populism is a lengthy one, several authors 
agree that alleged crisis situations are a precondition for the emergence of populist mobilization. Or 
at least that they can favour it. While the impact of COVID-19 has not been the same in countries 
around the world, in many of them this pandemic has been the biggest health and, in its aftermath, 
economic crisis since World War II. Despite the peculiar nature of this crisis, however, it is not 
obvious how populists may benefit from it. Like other catastrophes or natural events, COVID-19 is 
hard to politicize, that is, to become an arena of political confrontation among parties with the 
traditional divides (us vs. others; elites vs. people), at least in its initial stage. This crisis has popped 
up without having been triggered by populists as a consequence of the failure of the elite, migrants, 
etc. (Moffit, 2015). The chapter will provide a framework of analysis, discussing the literature on 
crises and populism from a theoretical perspective and in the light of the concept of politicization. It 
will then offer an overview of the main contents of the book. 
 
 
1. Crisis and populism 
Populism is an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017) and there is a 
lengthy debate on its definition and whether it can be considered as an ideology (Mudde, 2004, 2007; 
Taggart, 2000), a communication style (De Vreese et al., 2018; Aalberg et al., 2017; Jagers & 
Walgrave, 2007; Moffitt, 2016), or a political strategy (Weyland, 2001; Roberts, 1995). Nevertheless, 
scholars generally agree on a minimum definition of populism: the juxtaposition of the ‘good people’ 
with a series of ‘bad elites’ and disturbing out-groups (notable exceptions include Müller, 2016 and 
Urbinati, 2019). Populists in Western democracies present themselves as the ‘real’ democrats 
committed to explaining to the people ‘what went wrong, who is to blame, and what is to be done to 
reverse the situation’ (Betz & Johnson, 2004: 323). Democracy should be an ‘expression of the 
volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde, 2004: 544); instead it has been usurped by 
‘the elites’ who are to blame for all the major problems affecting ‘the people’. The positive valuation 
of ‘the people’ is thus combined with the denigration of their enemies, namely ‘the elites’ who are 
accused of being arrogant, corrupt and more generally of acting against ‘the people’ (Canovan, 1999: 





Similarly, the concept of the crisis has been widely associated with populism, although there is some 
debate about the nature of the link between the two phenomena. ‘Crisis’ is a term with a long history 
in the field of political philosophy and political science (Koselleck, 2006). From different 
perspectives, classical theorists such as Karl Marx (1981), Antonio Gramsci (1971), and Jürgen 
Habermas (1975) considered the crisis as a critical conjuncture undermining State authority and 
offering an opportunity for change. A crisis is not only an objective phenomenon; it also needs to be 
subjectively perceived as such and/or discursively pushed to the forefront by political actors. 
According to Colin Hay (1999: 317), while the concept of the crisis is ubiquitous within social and 
political thought, it remains one of the most ‘elusive, imprecise and generally unspecified concepts 
within the theoretician’s armoury’. In the literature, the concept of crisis is used to name mutually 
incompatible conditions, processes, and properties. For example, crises are generally considered 
temporary, but they can also be permanent; they are a one-off deviation from the natural course of 
events, but they can also be cyclical; normally they have a solution, but they can also be unsolvable. 
Hay addresses this gap by making an analytical distinction between the objective and subjective 
components of crises (see also Habermas, 1975). On the one hand, contradictions can intentionally 
be addressed by an agent through a decisive or inconclusive intervention (objective component). On 
the other hand, the same contradictions can be subjectively perceived as such or remain publicly 
unacknowledged. The combination of these two components results in a typology in which the crisis 
is only one of the different types of possible systemic contradictions and responses. 
A crisis is a moment in which systemic contradictions (i.e. failures) are widely perceived as salient 
in the political, cultural, or ideological spheres and decisive interventions and structural 
transformations are implemented. A political crisis occurs when the common rationalities in solving 
the problem are blurred and when agents appear to be overwhelmed in handling the facts in all areas 
of the crisis. The other names for it are failure, tipping point, and catastrophic equilibrium. Failure 
is an accumulation of unresolved systemic contradictions and the dysfunctional symptoms they 
generate, regardless of individuals’ perception or awareness. It provides the ‘structural preconditions 
for perceived crisis; the necessary but insufficient conditions’ for a crisis (Hay, 1999: 324). A tipping 
point is a moment at which an intervention made unintentionally, in a situation of unperceived 
systemic contradictions, subsequently ‘proves to be decisive in terms of the transformation of the 
system in question’ (325). Finally, catastrophic equilibrium (Gramsci, 1971: 276) refers to a situation 
in which symptoms of systemic contradictions are commonly recognized as a wider problem, even 
in the absence of mobilization and decisive intervention. 
The COVID-19 pandemic led European countries to a peculiar crisis situation where neither national 
health care systems nor the World Health Organization were able to predict or control the risk, and 
where the medical sciences were unable to face the pandemic effectively or rationally. The nature of 
the crisis does not fit in with the common problem-solving schemes of an economic or migration 
crisis and this is the main difference with the last decade of ‘crisis-ridden Europe’ in which populists 
have grown, sometimes playing an active role (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015: 303; see also: Trenz, Ruzza, 
& Guiraudon, 2015). 
 
 
2. Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism 
In this paragraph we need to disentangle the literature on crises and that on populism in order to better 
understand the role of crises in the rise of populism and the role of populists in the rise of crises. The 
role of crises in the contemporary populist literature is disputed. While it is quite common to find 
references to crises in the populist literature, studies devoted to this connection are rare and it remains 
in many respects undertheorized: the term is normally used in a vague manner, with no definition 
provided. Nevertheless, except for a few authors who have contested any link between crises and 
populism (i.e. Knight, 1998; Arditi, 2007), scholars addressing this topic generally fall into two broad 
categories: those who state that there is a direct connection between the existence of a crisis and the 
rise of populism, and those who are less sure about a causal link between these two processes.  
 
 
Ernesto Laclau (1977, 2005) is certainly one of the first scholars link the rise of populism to crises. 
According to Laclau (1977: 175) ‘the emergence of populism is historically linked to a crisis of the 
dominant ideological discourse, which in turn is part of a more general social crisis’. In other words, 
populism simply cannot emerge without a political crisis, which is considered a ‘necessary 
precondition for populism’ (2005: 177). A crisis of representation in particular is what allows 
populists to emerge and succeed. Several authors agree that this particular kind of political crisis is at 
the root of any populist mobilization (see Canovan, 1999; Roberts, 1995, 2015; Kriesi, 2015; Mouffe, 
2005). Among them, Hanspeter Kriesi (2015) links the current rise of populists in Europe to long-
term trends in political representation. As party democracy weakens, ‘the opportunities for populist 
protest clearly increases’ (Mair, 2002: 88). This process is even more evident in the light of the new 
‘integration-demarcation’ divide caused by the process of globalization (Kriesi et al., 2006, 2012). 
Party democracy is facing new challenges, since ‘divide theory meets Europe’s crises’ (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2017), and Euroscepticism, like populism, is becoming more mainstream (Conti, 2018). In 
Kriesi’s words, ‘the lack of responsiveness of established parties to the plight of the ‘globalization 
losers’ provided a chance for their mobilization by the new populist right parties (2015: 178).  
Focusing on Latin American populism, Kenneth Roberts (1995, 2015) similarly argues that weak 
political institutions and crises of representation trigger different types of populist mobilization in the 
region: top-down or plebiscitary mobilizations (i.e. Hugo Chavez in Venezuela) coexist with bottom-
up or participatory mobilizations (i.e. Evo Morales in Bolivia). Crises could of course have other 
natures besides political representation. Kurt Weyland (1999: 395) argued that crises of economic 
neoliberalism triggered the emergence of ‘neoliberal populism’ in Latin America, with specific 
reference to Carlos Menem in Argentina, Fernando Collor in Brazil and Alberto Fujimori in Peru. 
While Kriesi (2015) argues that a crisis of representation is ‘the basic condition’ for the rise of 
populism, an economic crisis is considered as a facilitating condition. In the last few years, several 
authors have interpreted the performance of populist parties as linked to the Great Recession and the 
European debt crisis (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015; Kneuer, 2019), while others have pointed to the role of 
migrant and refugee crises (Brubaker, 2017; Stojarová, 2018). For these authors, some kind of 
political and economic crisis is a necessary precondition – and the main explanation – for the 
emergence of populism.  
A second strand of literature is, however, more cautious about the link between crises and populism. 
As an advocate of the ideological approach, Mudde (2007) states that the concept of crisis is used too 
vaguely to have a heuristic value. While this link seems to be corroborated by the correlation between 
the electoral success of European radical right populists and certain empirical indicators of a crisis 
(i.e. economic instability, unemployment or political dissatisfaction), the under-theorization of the 
concept makes this interpretation not entirely reliable (2007: 205). Moreover, as suggested by Rovira 
Kaltwasser (2012: 186), this link applies better to a ‘liberal approach’ to populism that conceives 
populism as a ‘pathology’, as ‘a reaction to the malfunctioning of democratic rule’, while it seems 
less appropriate in other approaches. The relevance of a crisis is thus more nuanced in this strand of 
literature: a crisis can be a facilitating factor, but it is not necessarily a prerequisite for the rise of 
populism. 
Looking at the literature on crises and the rise of populism in the light of Hay’s typology, we 
acknowledge that most authors refer to different types of specific failures using the term ‘crisis’ 
uncritically. The success of populism is often interpreted as being the result of an external crisis 
(economic, financial, political, migrants, traditional values). The term is thus simply used to depict a 
conjuncture of disorder, chaos or breakdown. However, these are situations of failure that do not 
necessarily lead to a crisis of problem-solving rationality. Here the point does not concern just the 
terminological question. Populist parties have to be understood in relation to their current political 
and cultural field (Ostiguy, 2017; Weyland, 2017). Many commentators on European politics 
highlight the crisis of representation or democracy as the main factor explaining the emergence and 
success of populist movements. When applied to populism, Hay's typology is fruitful because it 
requires crisis situations to be considered as dynamic processes that may have different stages, or 
 
 
facets. In this process, populists can exploit the situation but also actively contribute to the emergence 
of systemic contradictions, which can lead to an actual crisis. At a critical juncture, populists need 
their anti-populist counterparts (Stavrakakis et al., 2018). 
In this perspective, populists cannot be conceived simply as actors reacting to external crises, but 
rather as actors that actively perform and spread a sense of crisis. According to Moffitt (2015: 195), 
it is exactly this performance of crisis that provides populists with ‘an effective way to divide ‘the 
people’ and their other, and to legitimate strong leadership by presenting themselves as voices of the 
sovereign people’. Populists can, therefore, intervene in those situations that Hay has called failure, 
catastrophic equilibrium and tipping point, and, through their action, ensure that these contradictions 
are clearly perceived among citizens and push the system towards the moment of decisive 
intervention (table 1.1). 
Two components – one real, referred to as systemic failure, and another symbolic, referred to as the 
public construction of crisis – are thus mobilized by populists and become part of an irreducible 
dialectic (Stavrakakis et al., 2018). Populists exploit failures, catastrophic equilibria, and tipping 
points through the politicization of the specific issues that underlie them (i.e. unemployment, border 
control, corruption, Islamic veil, etc.). While politicization –the process through which issues ‘are 
thematised as contingent and controversial topics’ (Palonen, 2005: 44), becoming subjects of political 
confrontation among parties and citizens – is a process common to all political actors, populists, 
bringing every issue into their Manichean vision of society, create a sense of crisis and ‘use that sense 
to inject an urgency and an importance into their message’ (Taggart, 2004: 275). Populists therefore 
exploit the contradictions of the system and contribute to amplifying them, in real and symbolic terms, 
through the politicization of broad or narrow issues related to them. They are performing the crisis 
(Moffitt, 2015) by giving it a discursive reality. As a communication style, populism benefits from 
the era of polarization and conflict-friendly communication (Blumler, 2016; Reinemann et al., 2019) 
 
Table 1.1 Contradictions, Decisive Interventions and Populist Interventions 
 MOMENT OF DECISIVE 
INTERVENTION 













(Adapted from Hay, 1995) 
	
This is how things normally work when contradictions are endogenous, determined by factors internal 
to the political system. But when contradictions are exogenous, determined by external shocks, their 
politicization is more complex, since causal attribution of responsibility is not always possible. This 
is particularly true for those situations determined by accidental causes or natural disasters such as 
floods, earthquakes, droughts, and hurricanes. Stone (1989: 284) explains that ‘these phenomena are 
devoid of purpose, either in their actions or consequences. In fact, one cannot properly speak of 
actions here, but only of occurrences. This is the realm of accident and fate'. These accidents are 
difficult to politicize since they are caused by 'events beyond human control'. They postulate a kind 
of innocence: no one can exert control over this kind of accident and therefore no one can be blamed. 
In order to become a political crisis, these kinds of accidents have to be framed as such by agents 
who have an interest in acting like that. In other words, they need to be politicized.  
The COVID-19 health crisis fits perfectly into this kind of framework, where there is a priori no 
political purpose or direct responsibility for the origin of the pandemic. Such a situation meets the 
definition of a crisis since both decisive intervention and public awareness of the problem are present. 
 
 
The peculiar nature of this crisis, however, requires further efforts to understand how populists can 
politicize such an issue and possibly benefit from it. Thus, while governments seek to steer the 
problem away from the intentional and toward the realm of nature (i.e. managing the COVID-19 
crisis as a non-political, science-based task), the other side, which often includes populists, tries to 
push the problem into the realm of human intention, in order to politicize it. 
 
 
3. Politicization of the pandemic crisis 
‘Politicization’ has long been a key concept in the study of politics. In the European tradition of social 
and political theory, the term connotes the process through which a given phenomenon or issue enters 
the sphere of ‘the political’ and thus turns into a target of contention, a hub for conflicts, a space open 
to alternatives and controversies (Palonen, 2003). In the American tradition of behavioural and 
empirical political science, the same term tends to signify a narrower dynamic, whereby the visibility 
of a given phenomenon or issue suddenly increases, attracting public interest and triggering 
mobilization and ‘voice’ (Easton, 1957; Verba, 1960). Additionally, ‘de-politicization’ has become a 
classical concept. In the wake of Carl Schmitt’s thinking (2008), in the European tradition de-
politicization is seen as the removal of a given phenomenon or issue from the realm of ‘the political’, 
or a preventative denial of its political character (Rancière, 1995; Wood & Flinders, 2014). In the 
American tradition, however, de-politicization mostly indicates a set of narrower processes such as a 
diminishing interest in politics and participation, the hollowing out of the public sphere, and power 
exercises aimed at thwarting potential oppositions (Pharr & Putnam, 2000; Roberts, 2017). On both 
sides of the Atlantic, de-politicization dynamics have attracted increasing attention – empirically and 
analytically – in the context of research on technocratic policy-making and anti-politics (Fawcett et 
al., 2017).  
In the last few decades, scholars have mainly used the concept of politicization within three different 
strands of literature (Zürn, 2019). Firstly, at the domestic level, politicization has been mainly studied 
as a process of de-politicization and re-politicization, especially in investigations of the decline of the 
class divide, offset by the globalization divide between integrationists and demarcationists (Kriesi et 
al., 2012) or between cosmopolitans and communitarians (de Wilde et al., 2019; Hooghe & Marks, 
2017). Secondly, the concept has been widely applied to the process of EU integration and studied 
through three key dimensions: the salience of the EU and EU related issues, their contentiousness, 
and the expansion of actors engaged with the EU (De Wilde, 2011; Statham & Trenz, 2012; Hutter 
& Kriesi, 2019). Thirdly, the study of politicization of international institutions has mainly focused 
on the ongoing transnationalization of social protests (Della Porta, 2007; Della Porta & Caiani, 2009). 
Scholars who have studied politicization in its entirety from the perspective of political theory have 
found that the term throws up different facets of a complex process and that more clarity is needed, 
starting with a specific vocabulary (Palonen, 2003; Hay, 2007). 
Alongside this literature, other scholars have dealt with similar processes applied to narrower 
contexts, such as the emergence of an issue as salient within the political field. Erik Neveu (2015), 
focusing on the development of public problems, defines it as a multi-stage process through which a 
private and non-political issue could be transformed into a public problem with a political scope. An 
issue needs to be constructed, performed and framed as a problem on the public agenda to be 
perceived as such (Gamson, 1990). Entrepreneurs of a public problem – ordinary citizens, 
stakeholders or political actors – need to implement a series of actions to introduce a specific issue 
into the political realm (Gusfield, 1981). This means framing the issue within the common political 
divides or conflicts at stake in the political field, or, with more difficulty, pushing the issue as a new 
divide. Among these actions, the ‘naming, blaming, claiming’ trilogy (Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, 1981) 
is noteworthy when adapted to public problems (Orsini, 2002; Zittoun, 2014). ‘Naming’ refers to the 
action of defining a private or public situation as unfair and worthy of being politically addressed 
since it produces individual or collective damage or injuries. ‘Blaming’ is the action through which 
one or more social or political actors are identified as responsible for the given problem. Finally, 
 
 
‘claiming’ indicates the action of proposing and supporting a solution to the problem (Neveu, 2015: 
41-94).  
 
In the light of this literature, we propose to combine the process of politicization with the three actions 
identified by Felstiner, Abel & Sarat (1981) in order to define a framework for the analysis of the 
politicization of issues (table 1.2). We argue that an issue, to be politicized, should follow three stages 
in which distinct processes, actions, objects of contention, and outputs follow one another. In the 
phase of the emergence of a problem, the action of ‘naming’ brings a given issue into the political 
field and allows political agents to earn a place as legitimate players in the crisis-solving process; in 
the confrontation phase, the attribution of accountability and ownership of the issue is determined 
through the ‘blaming’ action; finally, in the managing phase, the action of ‘claiming’ refers to the 
confrontation of issue-specific solutions. 
 
Table 1.2 Politicization of public problems/issues 
Phase Action Contention Output 
Emergence Naming Political vs. non-political 
status of the problem/issue 
One or more political or social actors identify a 
specific problem/issue as a problem/issue with a 
public scope and political nature. 
The issue becomes a new political divide or 
opposition. 
Confrontation Blaming Attribution of 
accountability and 
ownership of the 
problem/issue 
One or more political or social actors blame 
other actors for not facing the problem, or not 
facing it with the necessary urgency and 
effectiveness 
Managing Claiming Alternative problem/issue-
specific solutions 
One or more political or social actors proposes a 
solution and claims the ability to solve the 
problem/issue 
 
These are also the steps of the political process traditionally followed by populist movements in order 
to trigger and perform a crisis through which they gain legitimacy: naming the crisis by identifying 
failures and elevating the crisis level; blaming those responsible who acted against the interests of the 
people, using the media; and finally, claiming new solutions. This framework will allow us to study 
the politicization of the COVID-19 issue by looking at the divide between the political and the non-
political status of the issue, disputes about different stakes and their relative priority in managing the 
crisis, and issue-specific and policy-related contentions about COVID-19. The suddenness of the 
pandemic is interesting, since there is no previous issue ownership at stake. 
 
 
4. Aims, Framework and Structure of the Book 
In the light of the above, the book aims to provide an initial overview of how populist parties reacted 
during the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. The general research question asks whether populists have 
benefited from the COVID-19 crisis (RQ1), gaining centrality in the political field and/or using the 
crisis to push forward new opposition lines. Through a comparative approach, it focuses especially 
on two sub-questions: how have populists adapted their discourse to the pandemic crisis (RQ1a)? 
And how have populists politicized the COVID-19 issue (RQ1b)? Besides systemic differences, our 
assumption is that populists’ ability to politicize the COVID-19 issue has been key to their taking 
 
 
advantage of the crisis in terms of relevance in the political debate and citizens’ opinion. In addition, 
since populists have achieved key policy victories and survived the experience of government in 
recent years (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015) by maintaining a high level of politization and 
polarization on controversial issues (Pappas, 2019), a second research question asks whether populists 
in power and populists in opposition have faced COVID-19 in a similar or a different way (RQ2). 
While the classical divides seem (at least temporarily) to have weakened, we posit that the COVID-
19 crisis has opened a window of opportunity for traditional populist claims such as those about 
controlling borders or against the (pharmaceutical and scientific) elites, with claims tailored for the 
crisis, such as the limitation of public freedoms or support for new conspiracy theories. 
The analysis aims to identify the main features of populist action by focusing on the leaders’ 
statements and their political initiatives over a period of four months, from January to May. This 
period covers three different phases: (a) pre-COVID phase, when the COVID-19 crisis was 
elsewhere, and there were no contagions or national outbreaks; (b) the phase of virus spread and 
containment measures, when COVID-19 was widely diffuse in the country and restrictive measures 
were taken by the political authorities; and (c) the mitigation of contagion phase, when the virus 
spread was under control in the country and restrictive measures were eased or removed. With regard 
to official activities on their websites and social media profiles, two distinct analyses were run. On 
the one hand, the key elements of populism – the people, the elites, and outgroups – were analysed 
in order to understand how they discourses unfolded in this crisis situation and whether they changed 
compared to a routine period (RQ1a). On the other hand, an assessment was made of how populists 
defined and attempted to politicize the COVID-19 issue, using the framework of politicization based 
on the naming, blaming, claiming formula (table 1.2). 
The variety of cases analysed (hard hit by the crisis or otherwise) and types of populism (right-wing, 
left-wing, in power or not) allow this book to contribute to the literature on crises and populism, to 
account for similarities and differences and to define patterns among different types of populism 
(RQ2). We gathered data from eight European countries from various geographical regions of the 
European Union that were differently affected by the pandemic (table 1.3). Four countries were in a 
critical situation: Spain, Italy, France and the United Kingdom. Conversely, two countries were 
affected very little by the pandemic (Poland and Czech Republic). Finally, we add two countries 
experiencing a medium situation (Germany and Hungary). These eight countries implemented and 
experimented with different policies to face the crisis. We also mixed different political situations 
(table 1.4): countries with governing populist parties (Italy, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and 
Spain) with ones with non-governing populist parties (France, Germany, UK). 
 
Table 1.3 Impact of COVID-19 in the cases selected (10 June 2020)  
Reported Deaths Reported deaths per 100,000 population Impact of COVID-19 
Spain 27,136 58.1 
High 
UK 40,883 61.5 
Italy 34,043 56.3 
France 29,296 43.7 
Germany 8,729 10.5 
Medium Hungary 550 5.6 









Table 1.4 Populists parties in the cases selected 
 Impact of COVID-19 
Relevance of populism High  Medium Low 
In power Italy (M5S) 
Spain (Podemos) 
Hungary (Fidesz and 
KDNP) 
Poland (PiS) 
Czech Republic (ANO) 
In opposition Italy (League) 
UK (Brexit Party) 
France (RN and LFI) 
Spain (Vox) 
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